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Abstract: 1 
 2 
Independent regulatory agencies (IRAs) for Health Technology Assessment (HTA) are a 3 
key means by which national governments have responded to the challenge of ensuring 4 
equitable public access to a new range of medicines and treatment options within the 5 
context of limited national budgets for healthcare.  In this paper, we apply a regulatory 6 
governance frame to the study of the Swedish process for HTA.  Based on qualitative 7 
interviews with key institutional stakeholders, we suggest that the major challenge for 8 
Swedish IRAs for HTA is successfully communicating nationally produced research 9 
outputs to the regional authorities responsible for the delivery of health services.  We 10 
conclude that a regulatory governance approach to the analysis of national processes for 11 
HTA has the capacity to draw attention to a new range of challenges and issues which 12 
have direct relevance to improving the conduct of HTA within national regulatory spaces. 13 
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A Regulatory Governance Perspective on Health Technology Assessment 32 
(HTA) in Sweden 33 
 34 
 35 
1. Approaching Divergence and Hybridity in Methods and Processes for HTA 36 
In Europe and around the world, policymakers have responded to common functional 37 
pressures of balancing limited health budgets against the requirement to ensure 38 
comprehensive and equitable public access to new medicines and health technologies by 39 
establishing independent regulatory agencies (IRA) for Health Technology Assessment 40 
(HTA)—such as the Haute Autorité de Santé (HAS) in France, the Dental and 41 
Pharmaceutical Benefits Agency (TLV) in Sweden and the National Institute for Health 42 
and Care Excellence (NICE) in England.  These IRAs produce evaluations of new health 43 
technologies that integrate a range of economic, epidemiological and public health 44 
evidence for the purpose of supporting policies on reimbursement, pricing, and the use of 45 
technologies in clinical practice.  In principle, these agencies provide more legitimate, 46 
transparent and accountable methods and processes through which governments can 47 
respond to pressures associated with delivering efficient and equitable public access to 48 
new health technologies.  For the future, the role of IRAs for HTA within national policy 49 
making processes is likely to expand as a wider and more sophisticated array of treatment 50 
options becomes available to patients, thus placing additional demands on national health 51 
care budgets. 52 
 53 
Despite their common remit, national IRAs for HTA exhibit diverse characteristics.  54 
Across the European Union (EU), for example, member states (MSs) have established a 55 
variety of dissimilar IRAs that utilize and apply a broad range of methods, processes and 56 
evidential requirements for evaluating the benefits and costs of health technologies.  57 
Typically, these divergences have prompted wider research initiatives and policy agendas 58 
for the harmonization of HTA methods and processes across the EU.  Such agendas 59 
emphasize the benefits of adapting evaluations of individual technologies for cross border 60 
use, and developing systematic approaches for evaluating the efficacy of individual 61 
technologies [14, 15].  At the European level, the proliferation of national HTA agencies 62 
has produced interest in cooperation and the exchange of HTA knowledge for the 63 
purpose of reducing expenditure and the duplication of work programs [16, 17, 18].  At 64 
the industry level too, there is support from major pharmaceutical companies for a 65 
harmonization of HTA methods for the purpose of producing nationally transferable 66 
results [19, 20].  Policy analysts have also suggested the establishment of a European 67 
drug pricing and reimbursement agency similar to the European Medicines Agency 68 
(EMA) [21].  Further, they have also argued that comparative efficacy data should have a 69 
formal role in European drug approvals; and that European authorities should collaborate 70 
with national HTA agencies towards the better congruence of licensing and 71 
reimbursement requirements [22].  The European Parliament’s directive on patient rights 72 
and cross-border health care also supported more formalized cooperation between 73 
national HTA agencies through the European Network for Health Technology 74 
Assessment (EUnetHTA) [23].   75 
 76 
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Recently, however, some scholars have taken a more nuanced position with regard to 77 
instances of divergence and difference, suggesting that the key challenge for the future 78 
study of HTA involves the construction of an analytical framework capable of identifying 79 
the institutional, domestic and other factors that shape national processes for HTA 80 
(Klingler et al 2013; Wright et al 2014).  Taking a regulatory governance perspective, 81 
these scholars suggest that any reasonably sophisticated account of national approaches 82 
to HTA must recognize that globalization and the emergence of advanced industrial 83 
society involves the potential for widely varying processes, methods and evidential 84 
requirements.  Globalization, they argue, touches policy sectors, markets, and regulatory 85 
regimes to different degrees and some sectors are more likely to exhibit hybridity and 86 
divergence at the national level than others [31, 32].  For example, in banking and 87 
finance, both markets and regulations are global.  Alternatively, in other sectors like 88 
gambling and health care, both markets and regulations are national, meaning that 89 
national governments differ in terms of how much and what kinds of protections and 90 
services they offer.  In the case of health technologies, however, regulations are subject to 91 
globalization, yet markets are not [33].  In other words, manufacturing practices for 92 
pharmaceuticals have been standardized to a very high degree, but individual nation 93 
states remain the monopolistic buyers in the largest markets, and so practices for HTA 94 
are mostly national [32].  Thus, in the health care sector, there is increased scope for 95 
policy mechanisms and innovations to become more political than technical, and more 96 
parochial than structural at the national level [34, 25].  Consequently, the fact that 97 
national processes for HTA exhibit significant divergences in terms of institutions, 98 
methods and evidential requirements should come as no surprise. 99 
 100 
 101 
2. Comparative Policy Research and Regulatory Space 102 
More to the point, these divergent perspectives on HTA also involve different analytical 103 
lenses.  For example, policy initiatives and research agendas for the harmonization of 104 
HTA methods and process typically apply a comparative lens to the study of HTA.  105 
Broadly, comparative policy research involves the comparison and analysis of national 106 
health systems with a view to understanding why these behave in certain ways and what 107 
policy-makers can do to improve their performance [1]. Comparative research promises a 108 
detailed and policy relevant account of the restrictions and potentialities for the 109 
improvement of national health systems.  The perspective highlights convergences and 110 
divergences across national contexts.  On this basis, it makes prescriptive ‘best practice’ 111 
suggestions about how methods and process within national systems can be improved [2, 112 
3].  Comparative approaches are interested in system configurations across national 113 
borders, and in identifying the factors and alternate constructions that produce 114 
comparable or dissimilar outcomes elsewhere [4, 5, 6].  In terms of HTA, some 115 
comparative studies offer statistical and largely descriptive reports that highlight data on 116 
a number of countries assumed to constitute a coherent class, analyzing the impact of 117 
HTA on policymaking across national contexts [7, 8, 9, 10]. Others offer collections of 118 
national case studies, describing institutions, roles and responsibilities. Some compare 119 
national studies emphasizing themes like competition and privatization.  And others often 120 
take a specific medical theme as the focus of their analysis, such as oncology or diabetes 121 
[11, 12, 13].   122 
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In this way, comparative approaches also tend to focus on functional accounts of single 123 
national IRAs, like TLV, HAS or NICE, assuming that these are comparable 124 
organizations and the sole sources of power and legitimacy within the wider regulatory 125 
domain.  Here, they often press distinctions between HTA as a process of providing new 126 
knowledge, or the structured assessment of a health-care technology; and HTA as an 127 
appraisal process that is more context specific, and which converts the analysis into 128 
policy advice [26].  Under the comparative lens, national IRAs for HTA sit at the 129 
interface of scientific knowledge and practical policy making.  Accordingly, their 130 
‘scientific’ assessment processes are considered broadly transferable across national 131 
contexts.  And equally, some assessment methods are considered better than others.  132 
NICE, for example, is thought to set “the benchmark for the use of HTA placed at the 133 
centre of a transparent and consultative decision-making process” (Stevens and Longson 134 
2013, p. 324; Stevens and Milne 2004).  On this basis, the key aim of the comparative 135 
study is to place pressure on national HTA agencies to reform their assessment processes 136 
based on the better example of their peers [13].  In achieving this aim, comparative 137 
approaches tend to bracket, or to ignore altogether, issues of context, in favor of common 138 
policy lessons, core sets of structural, technical, and procedural requirements for the 139 
conduct of HTA that apply above and beyond the policy domain of individual states.   140 
 141 
Alternatively, a regulatory governance perspective on the study of HTA takes a more 142 
holistic approach, sometimes styled a ‘regulatory space’ approach.  Regulatory space is a 143 
holistic concept within the field of regulatory governance that frames steering and other 144 
regulatory activities within a spatially defined context (Hancher and Moran 1989).  Under 145 
a regulatory space approach, the entire range of issues and processes to which any public 146 
decision within a specific sector is subjected defines the boundaries of the regulatory 147 
space [28, 36].  For example, in terms of HTA, a regulatory space approach considers the 148 
entire pathway from the regulatory approval of new health technologies to their use in 149 
clinical practice.  Along the way, the approach analyses the wide variety of factors that 150 
intervene to influence the use and application of particular processes, assessment 151 
methodologies and evidence bases.  Essentially, the regulatory space frame denies the 152 
construction of HTA as a twofold process of assessment and appraisal.  Under the 153 
approach, institutional and cultural factors are essential to the reception and 154 
implementation of different methods and evidence bases across national policy contexts 155 
[13, 24, 25, 35].  Or, in other words, assessment and appraisal processes are mutually 156 
constitutive.  As a result, the regulatory space frame is more comfortable with instances 157 
of difference and diversity.  And by consequence, IRAs no longer sit at the interface of 158 
scientific knowledge and practical policy making.  Equally, institutions like NICE no 159 
longer set the ‘benchmark’ for their peers.  Under a regulatory space frame, an institution 160 
like NICE is better represented as making a scientifically rigorous, and arguably 161 
expensive, use of economic analyses for the purpose of driving a national health system 162 
characterized by universal and free access to health care, in which the profits and prices 163 
of pharmaceuticals are regulated by an initial agreement between industry and 164 
government (Wright et al 2014).   165 
 166 
From this perspective, the point is that a wide variety of factors work against the 167 
possibilities for policy learning and transferability of methods and processes in any direct 168 
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and easy fashion.  And by contrast, comparative approaches are often insensitive to the 169 
fact that national policy makers respond to multiple stimuli in establishing institutions 170 
and process for HTA, of which ‘best practice’ methods and optimum evidential 171 
requirements are but one element.  Accordingly, the ‘raw materials’ of a regulatory space 172 
frame are much broader than those of the comparative perspective.  For example, a 173 
regulatory space approach involves the analysis of policy networks for HTA, highlighting 174 
the multiplicity of institutions and actors who do, or have, the potential to participate in 175 
policy making [37].  Futhermore, the historical, political and cultural content of the 176 
national decision making environment, its relation to the use and mix of particular 177 
agencies and methods of operation, are also relevant to the approach (38, 24).   178 
Ultimately, regulatory scholars argue that the development of an analytical framework 179 
capable of identifying and critically analyzing these factors is a key challenge for future 180 
research given its potential to generate new range of policy relevant insights into HTA 181 
processes, how they work and how they can be improved.  182 
 183 
The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate the potential of this frame to deliver insights 184 
into national HTA systems: in this case, Sweden.  We conducted a qualitative case study 185 
of key national agencies engaged in the Swedish process for HTA with a view to 186 
uncovering salient points at which HTA processes either work well, or require attention.  187 
Broadly, we found that the powers of the Swedish County Councils to levy taxes and 188 
finance the provision of healthcare at the regional level place limits the role of national 189 
HTA agencies in delivering cost effective health services.  In Sweden, the major 190 
challenge for national HTA IRAs is much less about discovering ‘best practice’ methods 191 
and optimum evidential requirements, and much more about successfully communicating 192 
national findings and negotiating their uptake at the regions.
1
 193 
 194 
 195 
3. The Swedish ‘Regulatory Space’ for HTA  196 
Reflecting both the history and the organizational structure of Swedish government, the 197 
Swedish regulatory space for health technology assessment is highly decentralized.  In 198 
Sweden, there are three levels of government: the national government, the county 199 
councils and the municipalities.  Of these three levels, the county councils and the 200 
municipalities play the dominant roles in the provision of health care services.  Under the 201 
Health and Medical Services Act of 1982, the county councils are responsible for 202 
providing services to persons living within their boundaries and also for promoting the 203 
health of all residents [40].  Critically, the councils have the power to levy income taxes 204 
on their residents and are not dependent on the national government for income.  At the 205 
local level, the councils exist on a parallel basis with municipalities, which are 206 
responsible for the provision of public education, aged care and child care, infrastructure 207 
and utilities within their areas.  Like the councils, the municipalities also hold the power 208 
to levy income taxes [40].   209 
 210 
The significant responsibilities and powers of the municipalities and councils have 211 
important historical and cultural roots.  Historically, the majority of the Swedish 212 
                                                 
1
 The first two sections of the paper appear similarly in other papers published by this research group [XXXXXX]. This is due to the fact 
that we have conducted this research together and have developed and applied the theoretical framework for analysis jointly. 
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population has resided in provincial areas, which are characterized by cultural, religious 213 
and legal differences.  Within these areas, health care has been the historical concern of 214 
the functioning regional public authority.  From about the seventeenth century, rural 215 
cities took responsibility for employing medical doctors within their communities.  216 
Established in 1862, the Swedish county councils adopted health care provision as one of 217 
their principal duties, and took responsibility for all aspects of health care [40].  Today, 218 
twenty-one county councils hold primary responsibility for planning, delivering and 219 
funding health care services within their areas, which many have further devolved to 220 
health care districts via the device of global budgets.  Essentially, councils have 221 
consolidated their responsibilities for health care provision within larger health care 222 
regions in order to stem increased pressures for cost containment and to improve 223 
efficiency.  Encompassing an average population base of about 1 million people, these 224 
health care regions have encouraged cooperation and joint learning between the councils 225 
[40]  Although they operate independently, the regions often mimic each other’s 226 
behavior, thus producing wider trends for Swedish health care reform.  For example, 227 
recent structural reforms within the regions have concentrated on developing primary 228 
care and coordinated aged care [41]. 229 
 230 
At the national level, responsibility for health care is largely restricted to coordinating 231 
and supervising provision at the regional level.  For example, the Ministry of Health and 232 
Social Affairs (MHSA) is responsible for ensuring that regional health care systems run 233 
efficiently, and that the councils live-up to their mandate of providing high quality public 234 
health care services [40].  The MHSA is also responsible for health care legislation, for 235 
social welfare services and for health insurance.  It holds powers to legislate temporary 236 
ceilings on county council and local municipality tax rates.  The MHSA also has 237 
authority to provide financial assistance for targeted treatments on issues of national 238 
public health concern [40]. 239 
 240 
Similarly, the National Board of Health and Welfare (NBHW) is a semi-independent 241 
public authority responsible for monitoring the activity of the county councils.  The 242 
NBHW follows up the regions, evaluating the services they provide against the goals laid 243 
down by the Government, with the broader aim of ensuring equal standards of care across 244 
the regions.  The NBHW is also the repository for official statistics on health and health 245 
care.  It encompasses the Swedish Centre for Epidemiology (Epidemiologiskt Centrum), 246 
which reports on the distribution and development of health and diseases across the 247 
country [40].  The NBHW also produces recommendations and clinical guidelines for 248 
new and existing technologies and procedures [42, 43]  249 
 250 
In terms of HTA process, however, there are four relevant agencies at the national level, 251 
these are: the Swedish Council on Technology Assessment in Health Care (SBU), The 252 
Dental and Pharmaceutical Benefits Agency (TLV), The National Board of Health and 253 
Welfare (NBHW), and the Medical Products Agency (MPA).   254 
 255 
The MPA is responsible for evaluating the safety and efficacy of new pharmaceutical 256 
products and for granting permission for their production across the regions [44, 45].   A 257 
new product or a natural medicine can only be sold in Sweden following an MPA grant 258 
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of marketing authorization, which is valid across the country for five years upon renewal 259 
[41].  Upon approval, pharmaceuticals are made available through the National 260 
Corporation of Swedish Pharmacies (Apoteket AB), a national distribution system that 261 
operates both high street and in-hospital pharmacies to ensure a consistent drug supply at 262 
uniform prices throughout the regions.  In 2004, there were about 880 pharmacies in the 263 
network, eighty of which were located in hospitals [40].  In 2009, however, the system of 264 
pharmacy ownership was re-regulated on the basis of choice and competition, and 265 
privately owned pharmacies and pharmacy chains were introduced into the state 266 
monopoly.  Under the reform, almost 50% of the state owned pharmacies were 267 
privatized.  Today, there are approximately 1200 pharmacies in Sweden, thirty percent of 268 
which are owned and operated by Apoteket AB [41]. 269 
 270 
Established in 2002, the Pharmaceutical Benefits Board (LFN) is the national government 271 
agency responsible for determining whether individual technologies should receive a 272 
subsidy.  The establishment of the LFN responded to financial pressures associated with 273 
rapidly increasing costs for pharmaceutical technologies.  The LFN reflected the need to 274 
ensure value for money, the need for rational and cost-effective public use of medicines 275 
and the requirement for the equitable availability of new technologies across the regions 276 
[40].  In 2008, the LFN gained additional responsibilities for determining dental benefits.  277 
Subsequently, the agency became known as the Dental and Pharmaceutical Benefits 278 
Agency (TLV).  Today, the TLV is a national government IRA tasked with determining 279 
whether or not a medicine or product should be included in the pharmaceutical benefits 280 
scheme, and at what price. To these ends, it produces clinical and cost effectiveness data 281 
based on the analysis of reimbursement applications presented by the product 282 
manufacturers [46, 47].  Since 2002, the TLV has also maintained the list for the National 283 
Drug Benefit Scheme, which it continues to review and revise [48].    284 
 285 
Consistent with its role of coordinating prices and access across the regions, the TLV 286 
uses a value-based pricing model of assessment, under which the price of a drug reflects 287 
its value to patients, rather than its production costs or costs in other countries.  The TLV 288 
expresses the cost–effectiveness of pharmaceutical technologies in terms of costs per 289 
quality-adjusted life-years, or QALY [41].  Critically, the TLV has no role in establishing 290 
guidelines for the use of new technologies.  Its sole remit is to make reimbursement and 291 
pricing decisions within 120 days of the receipt of the manufacturer’s submission [49, 292 
50].  These decisions apply across the regions.  And today, the TLV is also responsible 293 
for monitoring the pharmacy market with regard to the implementation of decisions [41].   294 
 295 
The Swedish Council on Health Technology Assessment (SBU) evaluates ethical and 296 
social consequences of medical technologies alongside considerations of clinical and 297 
cost-effectiveness.  SBU assessments involve multidisciplinary teams of 10-15 national 298 
and international experts [44, 8, 51, 52].  However, the SBU has no regulatory function.  299 
SBU synthesizes research findings, providing focus on the clinical aspects of new 300 
technologies and also their ethical, economic and social implications [51].  Essentially, 301 
the SBU publishes procedures for the use of new technologies including diagnosis, 302 
treatment and management of conditions [41].  Usually, it completes appraisals within 303 
two to three years [49].  In 1996, however, the SBU developed the SBU-Alert program 304 
8 
 
for the purpose of delivering more rapid and policy relevant assessments of medical 305 
innovations within six to twelve months [49].   306 
 307 
However, given the authority of the councils over budgets and its own lack of a 308 
regulatory function, a key issue for the SBU is the extent to which its activities actually 309 
succeed in influencing practices and policy at the regions [53, 54, 55].  Having the power 310 
to raise taxes independently of the central government, the country councils enjoy 311 
significant levels of autonomy regarding the uptake and use of medical technology [44].  312 
And to some extent, they replicate the functions of agencies like the SBU at the regional 313 
level.  Today, the councils are establishing ‘mini-HTA-organizations’ within their 314 
governance structures for the purpose of evaluating health technologies.  These 315 
organizations include: the HTA-centrum in Region Västra Götaland (RVG), ‘Metodrådet’ 316 
in Stockholm county council, and Centre for Assessment of Medical Technology in 317 
Örebro county council.  The methods by which each of these bodies conduct HTA varies.  318 
For example, HTA-centrum conducts the assessment on the basis of literature reviews, 319 
evaluating clinical effectiveness only [56], whereas the ‘Metodrådet’ utilises cost-320 
effectiveness data [57].  In addition, county councils also have formulary committees 321 
(läkemedelskommitté) that make recommendations concerning the use of 322 
pharmaceuticals. And by law, every county council is required to have at least one 323 
formulary committee (Medical Products Committees Act 1996) [41]. 324 
 325 
4. Methods 326 
This study was conducted as part of a larger project on national regulatory spaces for 327 
HTA across the European Union, with other participants including: England, Scotland, 328 
Germany and France, much of which we have already published elsewhere [XX, XX].  In 329 
total, 56 interviews were completed in four languages over a twelve week period in July-330 
November 2011.  In Sweden, 12 individuals within key agencies involved in the process 331 
from regulatory approval to use in clinical practice were interviewed, and carefully 332 
selected to represent the Swedish government at both the national and regional level.  333 
These agencies included: the Ministry of Enterprise (MoE), the TLV, the SBU, the SBU-334 
Alert programme, the NBHW, the IHE, the NCSP, the SDA, HTA-centrum and the 335 
Region Västra Götaland (see Table 1).  A semi-structured interview pro-forma was 336 
developed, questions were asked under three themes: functional pressures associated with 337 
the conduct of HTA; the response of the institution to those pressures; the response of 338 
outside institutions to pressures.  Questions under each theme varied according to the role 339 
and position of individual with organization, and also to reflect issues relevant to the 340 
individual organization.  Interviews were carried out by the first author and recorded and 341 
transcribed in Swedish and Norwegian.  No translator was needed.  The first author 342 
translated key statements into English to make them available to other non-Swedish 343 
speaking members of the research team.  In order to avoid unnecessary repetition of 344 
already published material, readers are encouraged to consult the fuller descriptions of 345 
our methods available elsewhere [XX, XX] 346 
 347 
Broadly, we found that interactions between Swedish national agencies for HTA were 348 
characterized by strong doubts about the ability of national government agencies to 349 
secure uptake of research outputs at the regional level.  Embedded within a decentralized 350 
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governance context, Swedish IRAs for HTA are fundamentally different to organizations 351 
like NICE in the UK.  Accordingly, meaningful opportunities for convergence, 352 
transference and policy learning, in any direct and uncomplicated way, may well be 353 
limited between these two players.  The major challenge with which Swedish HTA 354 
agencies are confronted is successfully communicating nationally produced research 355 
outputs to the regional authorities responsible for the delivery of health care services.  We 356 
detail our findings under three themes: (i) national and regional sources for HTA; (ii) 357 
producing coordinated research messages; (iii) the absence of formal regulatory powers.   358 
 359 
 360 
5. Results 361 
(i) National and Regional Sources of HTA Research  362 
In Sweden, regional institutions often produce HTA data over and above the data 363 
produced by national organizations.  For example, the TLV is responsible for assessing 364 
the cost and clinical effectiveness of pharmaceutical products.  Sources at the regions 365 
duly reported that “it was more or less decided that we should not evaluate drugs” to the 366 
extent that regional organizations like HTA-centrum focused on the assessment of non-367 
pharmaceutical technologies (HTA-centrum).  At the time of interview, however, this 368 
demarcation regarding pharmaceutical and non-pharmaceutical products was becoming 369 
blurred.  HTA Centrum and local agencies within the county councils were commonly 370 
performing appraisals of pharmaceuticals.  In particular, informants at HTA-centrum 371 
reported that they “had done quite a lot of drugs” because the other organizations within 372 
the county council “wanted [their] help” (HTA-centrum) in establishing the cost-373 
effectiveness of technologies.   374 
 375 
Sources at the SBU also remarked on the increasing number of organizations currently 376 
engaged in the production of information on new pharmaceutical technologies at the 377 
regions.  For example, the SBU is responsible for the conduct of systematic reviews on 378 
new technologies.  However, these reviews were also being conducted by the IHE, IHA, 379 
HTA-centrum, Metodrådet and other local HTA-agencies.  Sources at the SBU 380 
questioned the sophistication of these reviews.  “They all have started doing assessments 381 
nowadays…but… I would say that the SBU is the only one doing HTA in a proper way” 382 
(SBU-A).   383 
 384 
With the dramatic increase in the numbers of agencies actually conducting HTA research, 385 
The National Corporation of Swedish Pharmacies (Apoteket AB) cited the difficulties of 386 
extracting a distinct lesson: “there are so many actors… the risk is that these views…may 387 
contradict each other if one doesn’t cooperate” (Apoteket AB).  The existing system “is 388 
overly complicated…it is good if one coordinates even better the different initiatives” 389 
(Apoteket AB).  In order to extract clear messages from the wide variety of agencies 390 
engaged in the HTA process, Apoteket AB had “set up a separate group” within their 391 
organizational structure “to draw conclusions from studies…follow the literature and the 392 
development, looking at the SBU-reports, go through the recommendations of the 393 
NBHW, the MPA’s recommendations …and put it all together” (Apoteket AB). 394 
 395 
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SBU informants saw a role for the central government in resolving differences between 396 
organizations national and local organizations through a clearer specification of 397 
institutional responsibilities.  “We want the government to give very clear tasks to the 398 
different agencies” (SBU).  They suggested that the national government had a role in 399 
ensuring that “duplicate work is not done” (SBU-A).  Government needed to “centralize 400 
this work to one agency”, and thereby “increase the quality [of assessments], because 401 
then it would be done in the same way” (SBU).  Despite these admonitions, however, we 402 
also found that the structure of Swedish government, and the considerable authority of 403 
the county councils over the provision of health care, actually limited the capacity of the 404 
national government to centralize the work being conducted at the regions in one national 405 
agency.   406 
 407 
(ii) Producing Coordinated Messages  408 
For example, the multiple sources at which HTA information was being produced had 409 
prompted some national agencies to engage with each other towards the production of 410 
coordinated research messages.  At the time of interview, the SBU was in regular 411 
communication with all national agencies, the TLV, NBHW and the MPA, in order “to 412 
prevent us from giving different messages” (SBU).  Likewise, the NBHW also 413 
coordinated the release of its reports with the SBU with the aim of ensuring better uptake 414 
of the guidelines at the regions.  As one informant reported, “we try…to have a good 415 
timing with SBU Alert reports and our own production so that we take advantage of the 416 
basis [of the SBU’s report]” (NBHW).  The NBHW recognized the importance of 417 
communication and co-ordination when conducting appraisals in similar areas to other 418 
organizations.  In these cases, informants identified a requirement to co-ordinate both the 419 
timing and substance with other agencies.  For its part, the SBU also made significant 420 
efforts to communicate findings “both nationally and regionally” (SBU-A).  Specifically, 421 
the SBU engaged in outreach exercises, employing external experts to take research 422 
messages to the regions.  Informants suggested that experts needed to act as ambassadors 423 
for SBU research. They are “the quality leaders within the area…. when they go back to 424 
the health care after finishing their report, they are one of the best ambassadors of the 425 
report” (SBU-A).   The TLV was also engaged in communication exercise with the 426 
regions.  The councils were a particular focus for the TLV,  “we always work together 427 
with them in our decision-making” (TLV)  Further, the TLV also communicated results 428 
to stakeholder-organizations at the regional level: “We send our agenda memorandum to 429 
all the organizations; patient organizations, county councils, different…organizations that 430 
are affected by or could be affected by our decisions.  And so, I do believe there is a fair 431 
chance for everybody to get informed” (TLV). 432 
 433 
Although informants cited the willingness of organizations to communicate with each 434 
other; they also doubted the effectiveness of their communication strategies.  For their 435 
part, SBU informants reported that the impact of HTA research messages at the regional 436 
level was often closely associated with the remit of the agency performing the analysis, 437 
“different people, different groups and agencies, might come back with quite different 438 
evaluation of the evidence” (SBU).  In addition, the various forms of technical language 439 
associated with the conduct of HTA also complicated the reception of reports at the 440 
regional level.  Often enough, the sheer size of SBU reports functioned as a barrier.  441 
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Currently, the length of the SBU’ reports tends to be “500 pages typewritten, which is not 442 
very useful” (SBU).  Agencies needed to “improve on the way we present the data to 443 
make it more palatable for the health care professionals” (SBU).  They should use 444 
“language which could be understood” (SBU-A), avoid jargon and “very technical” 445 
reports (SBU-A).  Sources within the Ministry of Enterprise (MoE) believed that  446 
“agencies [should] present the material so that, even if you’re not an expert, you should 447 
understand the reports” (MoE).   Researchers and regional policy-makers “spoke different 448 
languages sometimes” (MoE), which restricted policy-makers’ abilities to access specific 449 
research messages.  450 
 451 
In general, levels of communication reflected both the quantity of agencies engaged in 452 
the production of HTA research and doubts about the effectiveness of communication 453 
reflected the different remits of these agencies.  Consequently, agencies often talked past 454 
each other.  Informants reported that well-conducted collaboration strengthened messages 455 
emerging from agencies, but did not guarantee that messages, however strong, actually 456 
influenced HTA agencies and policy-makers at the regions.  At the time of interview, 457 
some agencies were making internal changes to their methods of assessment with a view 458 
to enabling the transmission of more user friendly research outputs.  For example, the 459 
NBHW is currently exploring new means for increasing communication with regional 460 
policy-makers and stakeholders that are more relevant to the use of HTA assessments at 461 
the regions by establishing reference groups that involve patient organizations.  “We 462 
arrange conferences all across the country where we open up…for discussions around the 463 
guidelines” (NBHW).  Like the NBHW, the SBU is also interested in the influence 464 
patients groups have on decision-making: “They are quite powerful these days. The 465 
politicians are listening to them…they’re gaining more and more influence” (SBU).  In 466 
addition, the SBU was also focusing on professional organizations, which have a 467 
significant influence on research uptake “…that’s why we try to uses the professional 468 
organizations…as…external expert in our reports” (SBU).  By including professionals in 469 
the conduct of HTA “we know that whatever we say is based on…the group of 470 
professionals which are going to use the knowledge or use the product” (SBU).   471 
 472 
(iii) The Absence of formal Regulatory Powers 473 
Given the significant responsibilities of the country councils over the provision of health 474 
care, national agencies also lacked necessary regulatory powers and organizational 475 
resources to ensure the uptake of HTA research at the regions.  For example, national and 476 
regional bodies worked to different time frames.  At the regional level, the councils were 477 
critical of the SBU’s lengthy work schedules: “one can criticize SBU for these very long 478 
processes, three years and so on, that’s much too long” (HTA-centrum).  And even 479 
informants within the SBU suggested that the organization needed “to find a way to 480 
produce the reports faster than we do today” (SBU-A).  Informants reported that the SBU 481 
Alert reports, which were purposefully introduced to provide information more quickly, 482 
“take one year to write, which is way too slow” (SBU). 483 
 484 
At the national level, agencies criticized the capacities of regional organizations to 485 
conduct HTA.  For example, sources within the IHE suggested that the councils lacked 486 
the necessary competence to access the HTA-reports from the TLV.  They should “adopt 487 
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some health economists” (IHE) for the purpose of strengthening both their interest in, and 488 
their ability to understand, TLV reports.  Equally, however, human resource capacitates 489 
were also a key issue at some of the national agencies.  At the SBU, external experts were 490 
largely responsible for the conduct of all assessments.  But the use of external assessors 491 
also complicated the SBU’s work schedule.  Informants at the regions remarked that: 492 
“there are people from the whole country who shall travel and who shall decide about 493 
dates when they can meet” (HTA-centrum).  For its part, the SBU acknowledged that 494 
human resources and resource use were areas in which it “could really improve…by 495 
letting the employers at the SBU do more of the work and put less on the external expert” 496 
(SBU).  External experts often “have so much other obligations to attend that they cannot 497 
work focused on this report” (SBU).  Moreover, the additional use of more external 498 
experts in the quality assurance process following the completion of the report further 499 
delayed the output of research messages “we have too many external people in the quality 500 
assurance process, and I’m not sure that they add so much more quality to it, but it takes a 501 
long time” (SBU).  502 
 503 
At the national level, limited understanding of pressures on local budgets also restricted 504 
the uptake of HTA research outputs at the regions.  Specifically, national failures to 505 
consider these pressures resulted in the production of HTA research that had little 506 
relevance to the county councils in terms of both their interest and understanding of key 507 
problems.  In some cases, local policy-makers simply ignored national outputs.  The fact 508 
that “the budgets for the county councils are separate from the national budget” (MoE) 509 
often meant that the financial priorities may differ at the regions: “they have regional 510 
targets and local targets that can be opposite from the national targets.  That can be 511 
frustrating” (MoE).  At the TLV, the sense of frustration was palpable.   Informants 512 
reported that the county councils managed a local budget, and that their focus was on the 513 
budget, and “money…rather than cost-effectiveness” (TLV).  While the TLV produced 514 
research outputs based on cost-effectiveness per QALY, these outputs lacked relevance to 515 
regional budgetary considerations.  “On the national level, TLV understand value per 516 
QALY, but don’t understand budget…on the county councils’ level…they only 517 
understand what…budget is. They have no understanding of what value is” (IHE).  The 518 
lack of understanding of budgetary limitations at the regional level produced friction 519 
between the TLV and the Councils: it “is a very specific conflict…in the Swedish health 520 
care system” (IHE).  As a consequence, county councils may, due to “pure budget 521 
circumstances…take decisions that are not in line with what we say or what 522 
Socialstyrelsen or the NBHW, recommends as the guidelines” (SBU). 523 
 524 
Perhaps most significantly, the absence of formal regulatory powers acted against the 525 
impact of national agencies across the regions.  Having control of both regional health 526 
care budgets and health care priorities, the county councils enjoy a high degree of 527 
autonomy.  As a result, the TLV, the NBHW and the SBU can only recommend policies.  528 
For example, where the TLV recommends that “these drugs…are accepted by us and 529 
should be subsidized, it might later get to the county council level…and then they say no” 530 
(SDA).  Further, informants at the IHE reported that “guidelines issued by the NBHW 531 
is…not at all powerful…because it’s more recommendations” (IHE).  There is no 532 
obligation for regional policy-makers to enforce them.  The NBHW reiterated the point: 533 
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“we cannot decide. We can only recommend what should be done” (NBHW). Similarly, 534 
the SBU also highlighted their advisory rather than regulatory role, “we don’t have any 535 
means to force our reports into the health-care, none whatsoever” (SBU-A). 536 
 537 
Without means to enforce their recommendations, several agencies were engaged in 538 
conducting assessments of whether or not their research outputs had actually been 539 
implemented.  For example, the SBU follows-up the transmission of research outputs 540 
with implementation evaluations, which they currently conduct “by enquiries” (SBU-A).  541 
For the future, informants reported that these exercises needed to become more rigorous.  542 
SBU should conduct formal evaluations regarding the uptake of outputs that ascertain 543 
“where we do succeed and where we don’t succeed” (SBU-A). The NBHW also follows 544 
up the transmission of research outputs with implementation evaluations: “after we have 545 
published a guideline… we do a follow-up across the country…and see how the 546 
recommendation are being followed” (NBHW).   Although none of these procedures 547 
were formalized, they indicate the broader uncertainty across the regulatory space 548 
regarding the uptake of HTA research outputs.  In general, there was widespread 549 
consensus that current levels uptake of HTA-research needed to be lifted: “I think 550 
implementation of the result is one thing that we need to…improve…it’s not enough that 551 
we do very good reports if nobody uses them in the way they’re intended to be used” 552 
(SBU-1).   553 
 554 
6. Discussion 555 
Potentially, comparative research can involve assumptions that improving methods and 556 
processes for HTA is a straightforward task of surveying national approaches to HTA, 557 
discovering commonalities and deducing best practice mechanisms and processes for 558 
universal application.  In this way, comparative research has a tendency to bracket 559 
contextual concerns via an assumption that HTA is a two-fold process of assessment and 560 
appraisal, in which IRAs sit at the interface of scientific knowledge and practical policy 561 
making.  Our research, by contrast, suggests that context in which IRAs for HTA are 562 
embedded influences both their interactions with other agencies and the methods through 563 
which they generate research outputs.  564 
 565 
In Sweden, for example, the powers of the county councils to levy taxes and finance the 566 
provision of health care at the regional level limits the role of national HTA agencies in 567 
the delivery of cost-effective health services.  Certainly, national HTA agencies produce 568 
relevant information on the use of new pharmaceuticals, but the influence of this 569 
information on regional health systems is uncertain.  This potential for differences to 570 
emerge between regional and national priorities serves to differentiate the conduct of 571 
HTA in Sweden from its conduct in other European states.  In Sweden, the national 572 
government is unable to operationalize multiple mechanisms for pursuing cost 573 
efficiencies within the system in an effective way, and must rely largely on the 574 
production and uptake of cost effectiveness data.  As we have argued elsewhere, in 575 
France, by contrast, rigorous economic modeling techniques play little authoritative role 576 
in the current framework for HTA (XX).  And indeed, French policy makers harbor 577 
strong doubts about the legitimacy and practicality of setting budget constraints on 578 
financing health care service.  The French approach to HTA is a consequence of the open 579 
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nature of the French national health care budget, the structure of its financing 580 
mechanisms, and strong cultural values associated with ensuring unrestricted access to 581 
care (XX). As a result, French IRAs for HTA pursue cost-effectiveness gains in the 582 
system via that mechanisms rely on expert opinion rather than rigorous calculations of 583 
cost per QALY currently operated by organizations like the TLV.  In Sweden, however, 584 
national agencies are unable to bring expert opinion to bear on the delivery of health 585 
services in a coordinated way because they lack authority to decide regional health care 586 
priorities.  In order to have any influence over regional priorities, Swedish national 587 
agencies have little choice but to rely on economic modeling and the production cost 588 
effectiveness data, involving the use of QALYs, to maintain their relevance in the 589 
regions.   590 
 591 
The regionalization of health care funding is perhaps the most serious barrier to the 592 
influence of national HTA agencies [49, 52].  In Sweden, the regions often work to 593 
different perspectives, time frames and processes.  For example, national HTA-594 
organizations like the TLV evaluate the effectiveness of innovations from a societal 595 
perspective based on cost per QALY [40;46, 48].  But the county councils are concerned 596 
with maintaining their local budgets and are often less concerned with whole-society 597 
notions of cost-effectiveness.  Lacking powers to set regional priorities and to alter 598 
regional budgetary contexts, national agencies must focus on producing cost-599 
effectiveness data, which, at best, might serve to guide the decisions of regional policy 600 
makers.  And in such a case, it is perhaps even unreasonable to expect that Swedish 601 
national agencies should play an authoritative role in deciding regional priorities given 602 
their lack of responsibility for the delivery of health care services.   603 
 604 
The point is that the responsibilities of the county councils for strategizing and financing 605 
the delivery of regional health services raises serious intra- and extra-organizational 606 
barriers at the national level, which limit the capacity of national IRAs to exercise 607 
influence.  Certainly, Sweden has solid levels of expertise for the conduct of HTA at the 608 
national level.  But, under the decentralized governance structure, the capacity of national 609 
government agencies to deliver expert advice across the wider regulatory space is 610 
debatable.  The emergence and multiplicity of HTA IRAs at the national level, each with 611 
different roles and remits, has no doubt exacerbated this issue.  Today, national agencies 612 
produce a wide and, as informants suggest, sometimes confusing array of research 613 
outputs, which the county councils often elect to ignore.  While national agencies are 614 
busily engaged in communication exercises to harmonize and amplify the strength of 615 
their research messages in the regions, doubts regarding the effectiveness of these 616 
strategies remain.  And while the fragmented national institutional environment might 617 
benefit from government initiatives aimed at improving the coordination of national roles 618 
and outputs—for example, policy-makers might consider centralizing the conduct of 619 
systematic reviews in one national body by consolidating the TLV, the NBHW and the 620 
SBU in a single government agency—there is no guarantee that the even consolidation of 621 
these bodies would increase the appeal of national research outputs at the regional level 622 
given the lack of national authority in the regions.   623 
 624 
 625 
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Such a finding sits well with other analysts who have suggested that bridging the gap 626 
between HTA research and policy making is the most significant challenge facing 627 
Swedish HTA organizations in contributing to higher quality health care [44, 52].  For 628 
several decades, Sweden has been at the forefront of achievements for the development 629 
of well-established national, regional and academic organizations for the conduct of 630 
HTA.  At all levels, Swedish policy-makers, clinical professionals and health-care 631 
workers are largely supportive of HTA [44].  But, under the decentralized structure of 632 
governance, national research outputs do not speak for themselves and must rely on the 633 
regions for uptake.  In meeting this challenge, Swedish policy makers might do well to 634 
look to the similarly decentralized example of the Spanish healthcare system in which the 635 
regional Comunidades Autonomas have their own HTA agencies, while a national agency 636 
is called upon to implement national programmes and provide partial funding for regional 637 
HTA projects.  Certainly, the Spanish regulatory space involves very different 638 
administrative and cultural traditions, which we lack the space to consider here; but the 639 
mutual problems of managing resources and sharing authority within a decentralized 640 
governance context maybe sufficiently similar to admit some meaningful policy learning 641 
and transference between the two MSs.  At the very least, Swedish policy makers might 642 
gain some inroads towards a regulatory solution that could reasonably expected to work 643 
in a Swedish context. 644 
 645 
 646 
7. Conclusion 647 
While the key utility of a regulatory governance perspective on HTA is its capacity to 648 
draw attention to a greater range of challenges and issues with direct relevance to 649 
improving the conduct of HTA within national regulatory spaces; it achieves this end by 650 
discarding many of the key assumptions the comparative approach.  Essentially, a 651 
regulatory governance frame takes a very subtle position with respect to instances of 652 
diversity and difference.  In the first place, it expects to find them; and in the second 653 
place, it also hopes to build better methods and processes for HTA on the basis of this 654 
expectation.  The problem with the distinction between HTA as an assessment process 655 
involving the structured analysis of a health-care technology, which is transferable across 656 
state boundaries, and an appraisal process, in which the analysis is converted into policy 657 
advice, is the implicit assumption that methods and processes are not connected, or in 658 
other words, that HTA takes places within isolated and largely scientific institutions that 659 
apply self-selected methods.  On the contrary, our analysis suggests that the process 660 
through which research outputs are converted into policy advice affects the process 661 
through which these outputs are generated in the first place.  Put another way, national 662 
contexts often complicate the uptake of HTA methods and process.  The point is that 663 
policy makers need to develop regulatory solutions specifically tailored for national 664 
circumstances.  In Sweden, for example, policy makers might need to consider the 665 
prospect of semi-autonomous regional HTA organizations operating with some element 666 
of supervision from a methodologically rigorous national organization.   667 
 668 
 669 
 670 
 671 
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